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I Abstract 
 
After three EU directives aiming at full liberalization of the postal market, Austria finally had 
to give way to a liberal mail market. However, the paths to implementation of the prescribed 
changes are manifold. When faced with the decision between strong market regulation by 
governments or truly allowing free enterprise, most countries seem to opt for the former. The 
motives might be ethical, or maybe they aren’t. In any case, economic science betrays the 
amassing of government powers over supposedly liberal markets by teaching us that highest 
efficiency and welfare come from minimalistic market intervention, as opposed to regulations 
about any number of topics with regard to the market’s business. But since politicians will not 
extensively heed economic advice, it will be a long time until the market seizes to include one 
or a few firms with significant market power, whose strong positions inhibit the development 
of other companies and, therefore, get in the way of lower consumer prices.
 
 
Nach drei EU-Richtlinien zur Liberalisierung des Postmarktes, musste Österreich einen 
liberalen Briefmarkt zulassen. Die vorgeschriebenen Änderungen werden dabei jedoch auf 
verschiedenste Weise implementiert. Muss man sich zwischen starker staatlicher 
Marktregulierung und wirklichen Freiheiten für das Unternehmertum entscheiden, scheint 
vielen Ländern Erstgenanntes wichtiger zu sein. Die Motive dafür mögen ethisch sein, 
vielleicht sind sie es auch nicht. Die Wirtschaftswissenschaft lässt jedenfalls die Ansammlung 
staatlicher Macht über scheinbar freie Märkte erkennen, indem sie uns lehrt, dass höchste 
Ausmaße von Effizienz und Wohlstand aus minimalistischer Markteinmischung folgen, nicht 
aus Richtlinien zu zahlreichen Themen, die den Markt betreffen. Doch da Politiker 
ökonomischen Ratschlägen nur begrenzt Gehör schenken, ist es noch ein langer Weg bis der 
Markt nicht mehr von einer oder wenigen Firmen mit signifikanter Marktmacht dominiert 
wird, deren starke Position die Entwicklung anderer Unternehmen hemmt und dadurch einem 
Absinken des Endverbraucherpreisniveaus im Wege steht. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The EU’s postal markets have been liberalized by January 1, 2011, with the exception of 
Greece, Luxembourg, and most new member states, who are going to follow on January 1, 
2013. The countries that liberalized their postal systems prior to those dates are Finland, 
Sweden, United Kingdom, Germany, Estonia, and the Netherlands. 
The thesis before you analyzes the Austrian postal market after liberalization of the mail 
segment. An observation of the mail market under strict exclusion of other postal market 
segments would not have been promising, since the necessary infrastructure of distinct parts 
within the postal market is congruent and redundant.1  
This work consists of eight chapters. It is supposed to be understandable by readers 
without a university degree in economics or business, who at least have an idea of the 
fundamental structures of microeconomics. After the introduction, Chapter 2 explains the 
basics of monopolies. Chapter 3 deals with the topic of market liberalization and is followed 
by a chapter about the postal market’s liberalization in particular. The fifth chapter delineates 
the legal situation, as prescribed by the EU Commission and the Austrian legislator. Chapter 6 
characterizes the present situation of several liberalized postal markets in view of their 
youngest history. Thereby, it prepares the ground for Chapter 7, which, after commenting on 
the topic of abuse of dominant position, first depicts the probable and then the preferable 
future of Austria’s market for postal services, under the supposition that the EU’s directives 
are a given fact.2 Finally, the conclusion wraps up the information of this thesis, to let the 
reader digest the key points learned before. 
Keep in mind that this author does not examine the difference in effect between ex ante 
regulation and ex post surveillance and suggests to view both measures as distinct stages of 
market regulation, influencing markets in similar directions, yet not to the same extent. 
You may also take notice, if you will, that no discrimination of any gender is intended if 
the word “he” should be encountered more often than the female counterpart “she” – or vice 
versa – in exemplary cases where both could have been used. 
                                                            
1 See Spulber and Yoo (2005), p. 1689. 
2 This shall not be misconstrued to mean a lack of room for criticism with regard to likely economic results of 
the EU’s regulation. Rather it is supposed to be the Austrian legislator’s view from a nonpolitical, purely 
economic perspective. 
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2 Theory of Monopoly 
 
A monopoly can be defined as “a firm that is the sole seller of a product without close 
substitutes”.3 The fact that it has no competitors within its market, gives it a certain power to 
set prices. In a competitive market4, when one firm raises the price of its product, it will lose 
customers to competitors with lower prices. A monopoly does not run into this problem. 
However, customers can choose to buy less or stop purchasing the product altogether. Thus, 
the often assumed unlimited ability of monopolies to charge outlandish prices is a myth. 
 
2.1 Reasons for the Existence of Monopolies 
 
Monopolies, per definition, can only exist if other firms are kept from entering the market. A 
monopoly that charges very high prices could be undercut by a new entrant to the market 
whose lower prices would win her the necessary customers to stay in business. However, 
there are three possible reasons why market entry does not occur in a steadily monopolized 
market: 
• The monopoly owns all of a crucial resource. 
• The monopoly is protected by politics. 
• Natural monopoly. 
 
2.1.1 Control over a Resource 
 
Before internationalization it was easier for a single company to control whole markets. 
Authors of the finest textbooks have a hard time to come up with practical examples for a real 
monopoly of this kind. E.g., Mankiw (2001) and Varian (1999) mention DeBeers’ control 
over diamond production,5 even though the company is not a monopoly. 
A theoretical example would be the only copper mine on an isolationist island. 
 
                                                            
3 Mankiw (2001), p. 316. 
4 Competitive market: “A market with many buyers and sellers trading identical products so that each buyer and 
seller is a price taker” (Mankiw, 2001, p. 292). 
5 Mankiw (2001), pp. 317f.; Varian (1999), p. 429. 
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2.1.2 Governmental Protection 
 
The standard case of monopolies is government protection. Politicians pass laws, banning 
competitors from entering a certain market. There are two reasons for this scenario. Either the 
monopoly is created and/or protected due to cronyism, or securing public welfare is the 
motive.6 
A historical study of such cases is beyond the scope of this thesis, but governments have 
argued for centuries that postal services need to be procured by the state in order to avoid 
duplications of costs which arise because of the necessity to create an additional infrastructure 
for each company.7 According to proponents of monopolies, such duplication would lead to 
high price levels. Nevertheless, the theory does not warrant governmental protection of a 
market. If it was true and the economy free, the market would be supplied by a natural 
monopoly (see Chapter 2.1.3), but competitors would retain the chance to enter, as long as 
they find a way to build their infrastructure efficiently and make profits. Conversely, though, 
governments often outlawed entry to the postal market as well as to markets of other public 
utilities. 
 
2.1.3 Natural Monopoly 
 
Economies of scale8 are behind the formation of natural monopolies. This means that one 
large firm can produce at lower cost than several smaller firms. For this reason, monopolies’ 
negative effects for society are also mitigated in case of a natural monopoly, because prices 
are kept low enough to discourage small firms’ market entry. The large firm has lower cost 
per unit and can, therefore, make a profit at prices that would result in losses or much smaller 
gains for a small competitor. Many public utilities are suited as an example for this case. E.g., 
a community’s water supply is, in most cases, best procured by a single firm, namely the first 
to build a network of pipes. A competitor would later have to expend the funds to build a 
separate network of pipes, unless an agreement can be arranged to share the existing one for a 
                                                            
6 Mankiw (2001), p. 318. 
7 Rasch (2009), p. 39f. 
8 Economies of scale: “The property whereby long-run average total cost falls as the quantity of output 
increases” (Mankiw, 2001, p. 284). 
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certain price.9 However, without such an agreement and a lower market share than a 
monopolist’s 100 percent, it becomes a lot harder to make the investment for the network pay 
off. 
 
2.2 Pricing 
 
To start with, we assume that firms in a market aim at maximizing profits. Competitive firms’ 
approach to pricing is very different from monopolies’. The latter has market power10 
whereas the former does not. 
 
2.2.1 Competitive Pricing 
 
 
Resource: own illustration 
Although almost perfectly competitive markets do exist (e.g., market for wheat), they are 
mainly a theoretical example. A competitive market is a market with many buyers and sellers 
where no single actor has market power. Therefore, no single actor can influence the price. 
Every firm has to adapt to the market level since selling at a higher price would mean the loss 
                                                            
9 Cheaper solutions for a market entrant do occur in practice, but have their root in laws aimed at compelling the 
incumbent to share the existing network with competitors. 
10 Market power: “The ability of a single economic actor (or small group of actors) to have a substantial 
influence on market prices” (Mankiw, 2001, p. 11). 
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of all customers and selling at a lower price would lead to a situation where the firm produces 
at a negative profit. 
However, what a competitive company can decide is the quantity of its output. Its 
demand curve is a horizontal line (identical with marginal revenue), as in Figure 1. Nothing 
will be demanded of its product if it raises the price above market level. Conversely, if it 
lowers its price, it will drop out of the market due to losses, since revenue will seize to cover 
cost. The market price is the price charged by all companies in the competitive market. 
Notice these three equations (profit, marginal revenue, and marginal cost):11 
   
 
  
With those equations in mind, we arrive at the conclusion that the theoretical perfectly 
competitive market yields no profits for the competing firms and that these firms’ quantity 
supplied is determined by marginal revenue12 and marginal cost13. This information can be 
gathered from Figure 1:  
Note that firms are identical in a perfectly competitive market. We know that the 
horizontal demand curve depicts the price level at any given quantity sold. Since it is 
horizontal, it is identical with the marginal revenue curve. The marginal cost curve is the 
competitive firm’s supply curve, because it depicts the quantity a company is willing to 
supply at any price.14 Profit maximization takes place when marginal revenue equals marginal 
cost. In other words, if MR is smaller than MC, profit can be enhanced by producing a smaller 
quantity. If MR exceeds MC, profit can be increased by producing a greater quantity. 
 
2.2.2 Monopoly Pricing 
 
We have established that a competitive firm decides to produce a quantity at which marginal 
cost equals price, while the price is dictated by the market. Conversely, a monopoly can set 
the price due to its market power. It can charge a price above marginal cost. Even though 
                                                            
11 E.g., Mankiw (2001), pp. 278, 295. 
12 A firm’s marginal revenue: “The change in its revenue from selling one more unit” (Perloff, 2004, p. 352). 
13 Marginal cost: “The increase in total cost that arises from an extra unit of production” (Mankiw, 2001, p. 
278). 
14 Mankiw (2001), p. 297. 
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consumers buy less at a price set by the monopolist, his profits are still higher than the 
competitive firm’s (which are usually zero). At the corresponding quantity, marginal revenue 
also equals marginal cost, as in the case of a competitive firm. For a monopoly, however, the 
demand curve is above the marginal revenue curve. Therefore, a profit margin results at the 
monopoly price (see Figure 2). 
 
Resource: own illustration, based on Mankiw (2001), Figure 15-5 
A monopoly’s demand curve is identical with its market’s demand curve. Knowing that, the 
monopolist will choose a price at which profits are maximized and produce the quantity 
demanded at this price. 
The optimal outcome for a monopoly is reached by raising the price when marginal 
revenue is below marginal cost, and by charging less when marginal revenue exceeds 
marginal cost. Thus, profit maximization again takes place when marginal revenue equals 
marginal cost. 
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3 Theory of Market Liberalization 
 
Starting with a monopoly, what would society gain from market liberalization? In order to 
find that out, let’s have a look at the microeconomic concept of measuring society’s welfare 
or lack thereof. 
 
3.1 Deadweight Loss 
 
The perfect state of a market maximizes total welfare of actors within that market. Usually, 
this is the case when market forces are allowed to find the equilibrium without intervention. 
 
Resource: own illustration, based on Mankiw (2001), Figure 7-7 
Figure 3 shows the textbook example which is normally ascribed to a competitive market. 
The demand curve depicts how many potential customers would actually buy the market’s 
product at any given price. E.g., at a price of 6, those x people who would be willing to spend 
y or more on the good, each experience a welfare effect of y-6 by the transaction. The idea is 
that when you are able to obtain a good for 40, which you would be willing to pay 60 for, 
your welfare from the transaction would be 20. Conversely, sellers who would be able and 
willing to produce at a lower market price than the present one, experience a welfare effect 
accordingly. 
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However, when the market’s natural equilibrium is changed, which is the case as soon 
as a higher price is charged than the one at the intersection of supply and demand, the 
combined welfare of buyers and/or sellers gets smaller. The amount of this mitigation is the 
market’s deadweight loss.15 
 
Resource: own illustration, based on Mankiw (2001), Figure 15-8 
In a perfectly competitive market there is no deadweight loss. A monopoly usually causes 
one, as can be seen in Figure 4. The monopoly can charge a higher price than firms under 
competition. This leads to a lower quantity demanded and, therefore, part of the market’s 
welfare is lost. Apart from this change, consumers lose and the producing monopolist wins 
welfare. The remaining consumer surplus16 is the area below the demand curve and above 
monopoly price, whereas the new producer surplus17 consists of the area above the marginal 
cost curve and below monopoly price (both limited by monopoly quantity on the right side of 
their areas in the graph). Thus, we see that the market’s total welfare is lower in a 
monopolized market due to its deadweight loss. This does not answer the normative18 
question if a higher consumer surplus along with a lower producer surplus is better, but total 
welfare (both surpluses added) is regularly higher in a competitive market. 
                                                            
15 Deadweight loss: “The net reduction in welfare from a loss of surplus by one group that is not offset by a gain 
to another group from an action that alters a market equilibrium” (Perloff, 2004, p. 282). 
16 Consumer surplus: “A buyer’s willingness to pay minus the amount the buyer actually pays” (Mankiw, 2001, 
p. 143). 
17 Producer surplus: “The amount a seller is paid for a good minus the seller’s cost” (Mankiw, 2001, p. 148). 
18 Normative statements: “Claims that attempt to prescribe how the world should be“ (Mankiw, 2001, p. 29). 
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3.2 Oligopoly as Realistic Outcome 
 
In reality, the outcome of a liberalized market is not perfect competition. Unless economies of 
scale prescribe a natural monopoly, monopolistic competition19 or oligopoly20 is the outcome. 
A perfectly competitive market, as stated above, is mostly a theoretical example, even though 
some markets for agricultural commodities and a few others come very close to being 
perfectly competitive. 
 
Resource: own illustration, based on Lipsey and Chrystal (2007), Figure 9.1 
The challenge for a firm in an oligopoly is to anticipate the actions and reactions of its 
competitors with regard to changes in price and quantity supplied. When examining such a 
market, the price each firm charges and the quantity each firm supplies, are of predominate 
interest. For simplicity’s sake, let us have a look at the theoretical example of a market with 
two competitors. In 1838, the French mathematician Cournot21 presented a model that would 
allow the economist to simulate changes in quantity supplied by two firms in an oligopoly 
(duopoly), under the premise that each firm expects to be able to change its quantity for 
profit-maximization, without inducing the competitor to do the same. Even though this 
                                                            
19 Monopolistic competition: “A market structure in which many firms sell products that are similar but not 
identical” (Mankiw, 2001, p. 350). 
20 Oligopoly: “A market structure in which only a few sellers offer similar or identical products” (Mankiw, 2001, 
p. 350). 
21 Antoine Augustin Cournot (1801-1876). 
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assumption turns out to be unrealistic (as long as the duopolists have not reached the Cournot 
equilibrium), the model proved very useful over generations and is still taught today. Further 
assumptions are that 
• the two firms sell identical products, and that 
• their marginal costs are zero. 
When market demand and output of Firm 2 are known, Firm 1 can derive its demand curve by 
subtraction. Remembering the assumption that marginal costs are zero, marginal revenue of 
Firm 1 can be determined by its demand curve (see Figure 5). When Firm 2 produces q2, Firm 
1 maximizes its profit at an output of q1 (MR=MC=0). 
 
Resource: own illustration, based on Lipsey and Chrystal (2007), Figure 9.2 
Keep in mind that for any quantity expected to be supplied by Firm 2, Firm 1 has a different 
set of demand, marginal cost, and optimum output. The same is true on the other side. Firm 2 
also expects Firm 1 to produce a certain quantity (keeping it fixed) and has its own set of 
demand, marginal cost, and optimum output. When the competitor changes its output, this set 
changes accordingly, once more expecting the other firm to keep it fixed. Figure 6 shows both 
duopolists’ reaction curves. These curves depict a firm’s profit-maximizing output for a given 
quantity produced by the other firm. qm is the output that would be supplied by a monopolist 
in the market, since it is the quantity that would be supplied if the competitor’s output would 
be zero. qa equals market demand, as in Figure 5. Therefore, when one firm supplies this 
amount, the other one can sell nothing. 
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After introducing those extreme points, let us see how the equilibrium is reached in 
between. If Firm 1 produces qx, Firm 2 changes its output to qy, which in turn causes Firm 1 
to adapt its quantity to qz. This game of reactions continues until the quantity ends up at the 
Cournot equilibrium. At that point, given the other firm’s output, no firm will further change 
its quantity produced. Thus, the assumption that the competitor will keep its output fixed, is 
true at the equilibrium only. 
Oligopolistic pricing, as pricing under monopolistic competition, leads to prices that are 
above marginal cost, because firms in such markets do exert some market power, but 
lowering the price to the level of marginal cost in order to gain a larger share of the market, 
would decrease their profits. On the other hand, since their combined output is higher than the 
amount a monopolist would produce, the resulting prices are closer to competitive ones. 
Therefore, welfare is usually higher and deadweight loss smaller than under a monopoly. 
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4 Liberalization of the Postal Sector 
 
Whenever a market is opened to competition, certain topics arise that dominate discussions 
about pros and cons. 
 
4.1 Universal Service 
 
Societal welfare is the argument when it comes to the assignment of a universal service 
provider (USP), which usually is the incumbent. This firm will then ensure the availability of 
the most common services, because the public wants to rest assured that basic postal services 
are available and affordable at all times, even in remote areas. 
 
4.1.1 Assignment 
 
There are several ways to assign a USP: 
• The government can choose one or multiple companies and obligate them by law to 
provide universal services. 
• Firms may have to tender for the role. 
• A country might be able to rely on market forces. I.e., without putting certain 
obligations on firms, they could successfully keep up a satisfactory level of prices and 
services while competing with each other. 
At the same time, the provision of universal services must be financed. Thus, the question of 
corresponding net costs needs to be resolved. If the USP faces a financial burden by its 
obligation, compensation by other players within the market will usually be discussed.   
 
4.1.2 Scope 
 
When laws are passed to ensure a market’s universal service, the scope has to be defined. 
E.g., high-end services are unlikely to be part of the definition of basic services. Chapter 5 
informs the reader about those legal definitions for the postal market in the cases of the EU 
and of Austria. 
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4.1.3 Pricing 
 
A major issue of the institution of universal services is the question of prices. Most of the 
time, basic classes of letters or parcels are not only expected to be affordable, but also 
uniformly priced across the whole territory, even though delivery to remote areas is more 
costly than within cities. 
 
4.1.4 Quality 
 
When a universal postal service’s quality is discussed, issues include (among others) 
• street letterbox coverage, 
• outlet coverage, 
• delivery frequency, and 
• clearance frequency. 
The first two concern the density of access points. By regulating these, a government can 
control how far the average customer has to travel in order to utilize postal services. 
Additionally, the offices can be obligated to provide certain services of a predefined quality. 
The latter two are supposed to guarantee equal treatment for urban and rural recipients 
of postal items. E.g., a USP may prefer to deliver five times per week to all urban addresses, 
while performing delivery to remote addresses only three times per week. By establishing a 
fixed number of delivery and clearance days, governments can aim at minimizing 
disadvantages of addressees who live far off. 
Runtimes are another important quality indicator. 
 
4.1.5 Profitability 
 
As mentioned above, financing of the universal service is an issue. When the government 
assigns companies for the role of USP, they usually aim at averting financial losses that come 
from the assignment. Of course, a profitable universal service is more desirable. Profitability 
can be expected when market forces suffice to provide it and when firms tender for the role, 
because if it were not so, neither would firms fulfill the expectation by themselves, nor would 
anyone tender, except if he errs concerning expected profits. 
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4.2 Employment 
 
In a democracy, no discussion about a market’s liberalization is likely to ever take place 
without voiced concerns about the employment situation. Topics that must be dealt with 
during a postal transformation include 
• wages (especially minimum wages), 
• shifts from predominantly full-time jobs to part-time jobs and marginal employment, 
or vice versa, 
• possible technological advancements within the market that may lead to a lower need 
for employees (e.g., automation), and 
• substitution of postal services (e.g., by phone, fax, SMS, internet and e-mail). 
 
4.3 Service Quality and Price Levels 
 
Apart from a prescribed universal service quality, the overall service quality of the market 
could be enhanced or worsened after liberalization. The same is true for the price level. 
Services could become more expensive or the opposite might be the case. This is also a source 
of uncertainty. 
 
4.4 Distortions of Competition 
 
During a market’s liberalization, the incumbent should operate under the same conditions as 
competitors. Otherwise, the opening of the market is, to a certain extent, just pro forma. I.e., 
unfair conditions that preserve an advantageous position of the incumbent distort competition 
and, therefore, discourage entry. 
 
4.4.1 Denied Access to Infrastructure 
 
Should a market entrant be allowed to use parts of the incumbent’s infrastructure, and if so, 
should such a new firm assist in the construction of networks, build its own net, or be allowed 
to utilize most of the existing infrastructure? The postal standard case where this question is 
Liberalization of the Postal Sector  15 
 
 
regularly discussed, is the question of house letterboxes in multi-party-houses. Usually, the 
incumbent, having financed the letterboxes, has access to these installations and new entrants 
do not. Is there a need to grant access to the competition? What about the former monopolist’s 
property rights and his investment? Should he be compensated? Can competitors get along 
without letterboxes? These are some of the questions in connection with denied access to 
infrastructure. 
 
4.4.2 VAT Exemption 
 
Certain services provided by postal monopolists have traditionally been exempt from VAT 
(value added tax), as some governmental agencies and other parties have been.22 This means 
that all customers who are not able to file for reimbursement of VAT in purchased products 
and services, are, ceteris paribus, better off when buying from a provider who is exempt from 
VAT. This is the case for consumers and for other VAT exempt bodies. Only firms without 
exemption and those that are zero-rated for VAT need not care so much about a higher price 
paid due to the tax, since they will be reimbursed after their tax adjustment. However, the first 
group constitutes a huge pie of the postal market. Thus, a VAT exemption for certain 
providers qualifies as a distortion of competition. 
 
4.4.3 Cross-Subsidization and Predatory Pricing 
 
Cross-subsidization takes place when profits of one or multiple parts of a company’s 
operative business are used to subsidize other such parts. When these profits stem from a 
monopoly and/or from abroad and are used to subsidize operations under competition or in 
another country, the question arises if this constitutes an unfair distortion of competition. The 
situation with predatory pricing23 is similar. It also is conducted in order to achieve greater 
market power. Both scenarios can only come up when competition does not force enough 
pressure on the firm that applies these strategies.  
 
                                                            
22 Postconsulting.at (2009), p. 23. 
23 Predation: “a situation in which a large, financially powerful firm […] reduces the price of its product to less 
than its cost of production. [I]n order to remain competitive […], all firms in the market begin selling […] at a 
loss. Since the large firm has greater financial resources […], it is simply a matter of time until the victim is 
driven to the wall” (Koller, 1978, p. 4). 
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4.4.4 Cream Skimming 
 
Small firms may choose to provide postal services only within urban areas where prices can 
be kept low due to inexpensive operation. The USP cannot revert to such tactics, since he 
must deliver everywhere on the nation’s territory. 
 
4.5 Reciprocity 
 
When a country liberalizes its postal market, service providers from abroad are usually 
allowed to enter and start competing with domestic firms, even though their own markets 
might remain monopolized. Therefore, the question arises if this constitutes an unfair 
inequality or a disadvantage for domestic companies. The idea of reciprocity is to allow entry 
of foreign firms whose markets are also open to entry from abroad, while at the same time 
denying access to companies from monopolized markets. 
 
4.6 Market Regulation 
 
Liberalization24 and deregulation25 are two different concepts. A liberalized market can 
remain heavily regulated, or, as in the case of the EU, retain the potential for heavy 
regulation26. 
Is licensing necessary or should the postal business be open to anyone’s entry? What are 
the overall implications of regulation? Should regulatory authorities have more power than 
they already do? These are topics coming up with regard to market regulation. 
                                                            
24 Liberalization: “Abrogation of institutional barriers to market entry” (Rasch, 2009, p. 41). 
25 Deregulation: “Abolition or relaxation of regulatory rules that are imposed on market participants and market 
newcomers” (Rasch, 2009, p. 41). 
26 Regulation: “Governmental interference with the market process and with competition that curtails the 
freedom to transact and the freedom of contract beyond general norms of a market economy” (Rasch, 2009, p. 
41). 
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5 Legal Basis for Liberalization in Austria 
 
The following pages will outline how the European Union prescribed the opening of mail 
markets to member states and how Austria’s legislature implemented those directives. 
Austria’s law regarding the liberalization follows three EU directives, which were enacted to 
carry the idea of a single European market into the traditionally monopolized postal sector. 
 
5.1 EU Directives 
 
Momentarily, the EU’s lead to change postal markets is based on the directives 97/67/EC, 
2002/39/EC, and 2008/06/EC. The latter two were both built upon the first one, whereas the 
third made the second obsolete. 
 
5.1.1 First Postal Directive (97/67/EC) 
 
When Finland (in 1991) and Sweden (in 1993) had already liberalized their postal markets, 
Directive 97/67/EC abolished postal monopolies within the EU. However, member states 
were still allowed to grant reserved services to their incumbents, namely clearance, sorting, 
transport and delivery of mail weighing up to 350 grams and costing less than 500 percent of 
the lightest category of fastest domestic standard letters (Article 7). 
This happened to protect the area of the market that is by far the most profitable. The 
profits from it were supposed to be available in order to cross-subsidize universal services, 
which were at the center of the EU’s plans. These plans for universal services guaranteed the 
right of every citizen to access postal services. Additionally, member states had the obligation 
to institute compensation funds for universal service providers, in the case that the universal 
service obligation (USO) placed an unfair financial burden on the USP (Article 9). As stated 
above, the reserved area was very profitable. Thus, even though tariffs had to be affordable 
and geared to costs (Article 12), providing universal services was and is still a highly 
profitable business. 
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5.1.2 Second Postal Directive (2002/39/EC) 
 
By January 1, 2003, the EU shrank reserved services to clearance, sorting, transport and 
delivery of mail weighing up to 100 grams and costing less than three times the fee of the 
lightest category of fastest domestic standard letters. The same directive of 2002 already 
included the subsequent step of January 1, 2006, to further reduce the reserved area, regarding 
mail weighing up to 50 grams and costing up to 250 percent of the lightest category of fastest 
domestic standard letters. Back then, the elimination of reserved services was supposed to be 
realized by January 1, 2009. This was finally postponed by the third directive. 
The second directive also discouraged cross-subsidization of universal services outside 
the reserved sector by profits from activities within that sector (Article 12). 
 
5.1.3 Third Postal Directive (2008/06/EC) 
 
Table 1, without displaying Directive 2008/06/EC exhaustively, shows its main design, most 
of which was already enacted by Directive 97/67/EC. It also shows the transformation of the 
directive into Austrian postal law (PMG27). An analysis of Table 1 brings to light where 
Austria barely complied with the EU Commission and where it did more than demanded. 
When circumstances suggest the latter and it has any notable effect on the workings of a free 
market, you find the according passage underlined in the table below. If an EU regulation has 
no counterpart within Austrian law, the according box of the third column remains empty, and 
vice versa. 
The elimination of mail monopolies was delayed until January 1, 2011, for several 
countries and to January 1, 2013, for the new member states and those where difficult 
geographical circumstances abide. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
27 Postmarktgesetz = Austrian postal market law 
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Topic and resources EU Austria 
Reserved services: 
Article 7(1) and Annex 
II, Articles 2(1) and 3(1) 
2008/06/EC; 
§64(1) PMG; 
After December 31, 2010, 
reserved services were 
abolished for Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and 
United Kingdom.28 Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Greece, 
Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, 
Poland, Romania, and 
Slovakia29 have to comply with 
Directive 2008/06/EC after 
December 31, 2012. Earlier 
implementation is permitted. 
Austrian law, in compliance 
with Directive 2008/06/EC, 
abolished reserved services by 
December 31, 2010. 
Universal service 
guarantees: 
Article 3(1) 2008/06/EC; 
§6(1) and (5) PMG; 
Right of citizens to 
permanently access postal 
services of specified quality at 
affordable prices, at all points 
of a country’s territory. 
Affordable universal service, 
permanently accessible at a 
specified quality for everyone 
on Austrian soil, as part of 
basic services to all users. 
Assignment of USP (a): 
Article 4(2) 2008/06/EC; 
§12(1) PMG; 
Member states can assign the 
role of USP to one or more 
companies. If there is more 
than one USP, the assigned 
companies may provide 
different elements of the USO 
and/or cover different parts of 
the territory. 
The regulatory authority can 
assign the role of USP to one or 
more companies. If there is 
more than one USP, these will 
then provide different elements 
of the USO and/or cover 
different parts of the territory. 
Assignment of USP (b): 
Article 7(2) 2008/06/EC; 
§12(1) PMG; 
Member states ensure 
provision of universal service 
by letting companies tender for 
the role of USP, assigning a 
provider by law, or 
determining that postal service 
providers will fulfill the USO 
through the workings of a free 
ÖPAG30 is the assigned USP. 
                                                            
28 The postal markets of Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom, Germany, Estonia, and the Netherlands were 
already liberalized when the directive went into effect. 
29 These are countries that either have special circumstantial problems with the realization (e.g., due to many 
islands or low population), or joined the EU after Directive 2002/39/EC went into effect. Of the new member 
states, Estonia, Bulgaria, and Slovenia relinquished their right to postpone full liberalization. 
30 Österreichische Post AG = Austrian Postal Services Inc. 
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market, without interference. 
Duration of USP-
assignment: 
Article 4(2) 2008/06/EC; 
§12(1) PMG; 
Member states review the 
assigned USP regularly, but the 
period of assignment must 
allow assigned companies to 
realize ROI31. 
Reviewing of USP-assignment 
after 5 years. If other 
companies are capable of 
fulfilling the USO by then, 
firms can tender for the role. 
Scope of universal 
service (a): 
Article 3(4) 2008/06/EC; 
§6(2) PMG; 
Clearance, sorting, transport 
and distribution of postal items 
weighing up to two kilograms. 
Clearance, sorting, transport 
and distribution of postal items 
weighing up to two kilograms. 
This includes newspapers and 
magazines. 
Scope of universal 
service (b): 
Article 3(4) and (5) 
2008/06/EC; 
§6(2) PMG; 
Clearance, sorting, transport 
and distribution of postal 
parcels weighing up to ten 
kilograms (may be widened to 
a maximum of 20 kilograms by 
member state), and up to 20 
kilograms if the parcels were 
sent from other member states. 
Clearance, sorting, transport 
and distribution of postal 
parcels weighing up to ten 
kilograms. 
 
Scope of universal 
service (c): 
Article 3(4) 2008/06/EC; 
§§6(2) and 17(1) PMG; 
Services for registered and 
insured items. 
Services for registered and 
insured items. 
Density of points of 
contact and of access 
points: 
Article 3(2) 2008/06/EC; 
§§6(5), 7(1)-(3), and 
9(1) PMG; 
The density of points of 
contact and of access points32 
takes account of users’ needs. 
The density of points of contact 
and of access points takes 
account of users’ needs. This 
requirement is satisfied by at 
least 1,650 postal outlets 
nationwide33, whereas 90% of 
inhabitants of communities 
with a population of at least 
10,000, must have an outlet 
within 2,000 meters of their 
premises. For all other regions 
10,000 meters suffice.34 The 
                                                            
31 return on investment 
32 Access points can be post offices (run by the USP), agencies (run by third parties, contracted by USP), 
alternative solutions (e.g., mobile post offices and rural deliverers), or street letterboxes. 
33 §7(2) PMG: 165 of those outlets may (plus any existing outlets exceeding the requirement of 1,650), if this 
was already the case before December 5, 2009, continue to be opened less than 20 hours/week and/or less than 5 
days/week and/or refrain from offering all universal services. 
34 Haubenberger et al. (2010) argue (p. 26) that areas which did not fulfill this newly established requirement in 
the past, do not need an outlet to be opened within 10,000 meters of every citizen’s reach. In these cases 
alternative solutions (e.g., mobile post offices or rural deliverers) will legally suffice. 
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USP may only close down a 
post office, if it can rule out to 
run it efficiently and universal 
service is secured by another of 
the USP’s own offices. In 
urban areas, the maximum 
distance from an inhabitant’s 
premises to the next street 
letterbox, shall be no more than 
1,000 meters. 
Opening hours of post 
offices: 
§8(1) PMG; 
 At least 20 hours on 5 working 
days/week.35 
Available services at 
post offices: 
§8(2) PMG; 
 Post offices have to offer every 
product or service necessary to 
utilize universal services.36 
Frequency of clearance: 
Article 3(3) 2008/06/EC; 
§9(2) PMG; 
One clearance/working day, 
not less than five days/week. 
Clearance at least once daily, 
from Monday to Friday. 
Frequency of delivery: 
Article 3(3) 2008/06/EC; 
§10 PMG; 
One delivery/working day, not 
less than five days/week; 
delivery can be conducted to 
appropriate installations if the 
recipient’s premises exhibit a 
lack of ease concerning 
delivery, according to member 
state’s regulatory authority. 
Delivery at least once daily, 
from Monday to Friday. 
Newspapers must be delivered 
on Saturdays, too. Delivery can 
be conducted to 
Landabgabekästen (LAK)37, as 
far as this was already the 
common procedure before 
January 1, 2011.38 
Quality standards (a): 
Article 16 2008/06/EC; 
§11 PMG; 
Member states (domestic 
quality) and European 
Parliament/Council (intra-
community cross-border 
quality) set quality standards 
regarding routing times and 
95% of domestic mail has to be 
delivered D+139, 98% D+2, and 
100% D+4. 90% of domestic 
parcel items have to be 
delivered D+2, 100% D+5. 
90% of cross-border priority 
                                                            
35 Exceptions for community run post offices are possible. 
36 Exceptions are possible for points of contact that did not already fulfill the requirement before January 1, 
2011. 
37 LAK are rural disposal boxes. They serve as multi-party letterboxes at rural junctions, where deliverers can 
leave postal items for inhabitants of remote addresses. The concept is similar to house letterboxes of urban multi-
party-houses. Using or not using over 200,000 of those (Postconsulting.at, 2009, p. 51) on Austrian soil makes a 
definite difference in cost for service providers, and, therefore, in consumer prices. 
38 Exceptions are possible with recipients’ consent, or if delivery constitutes an undue burden. 
39 D is the date of deposit, whereas n of the expression D+n is the number of days elapsing between D and 
delivery. 
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regularity/reliability of service. mail and postal parcels leaving 
the EU, has to be transported 
out of the domestic USP’s 
responsibility D+3. 90% of 
incoming cross-border priority 
mail and postal parcels coming 
from outside the EU, have to be 
delivered T+340, 97% T+5. 
Quality standards (b): 
Annex II, Article 1 
2008/06/EC; 
§11(3) and (4) PMG; 
85% of intra-community cross-
border mail has to be delivered 
D+3, 97% D+5. 
85% of intra-community cross-
border priority mail and postal 
parcels have to be delivered 
D+3, 97% D+5.41 
Financing universal 
service: 
Article 7(3) and (4) 
2008/06/EC; 
§§13(1) and 14(1) and 
(2) PMG; 
If the USO constitutes an 
unfair financial burden, the 
USP may be compensated via 
public funds or by sharing the 
net costs of the USO between 
service providers and/or users. 
If net costs of the USO exceed 
2% of the USP’s total costs, the 
USP has a right to receive 
compensation from a fund. The 
compensation fund is financed 
by postal service providers, 
whose annual turnover exceeds 
EUR 1 million. Their share of 
payments is relative to their 
market share. 
Tariffs within universal 
service: 
Articles 11 and 12 
2008/06/EC; 
§21(1) PMG; 
Affordable, geared to costs (yet 
be efficient for the USP), 
transparent, non-
discriminatory. Member states 
may opt for a uniform national 
tariff. 
Affordable, geared to costs, 
transparent, non-
discriminatory. 
Accounting: 
Article 14(2) and (8) 
2008/06/EC; 
§23(1) PMG; 
The USP must keep separate 
accounts for services within 
and outside of the universal 
service obligation, unless 
universal service is secured by 
market forces in an already 
liberalized market. 
The USP has to keep separate 
accounts for services within 
and outside of the universal 
service obligation. 
Special privileges of 
USP: 
§12(3) PMG; 
 The USP may use public spaces 
of up to two square meters for 
purposes of aiding clearance, 
storing, transport, and 
distribution of postal items. 
                                                            
40 T is the date of completed transport to the domestic USP by foreign postal services. 
41 Items within the responsibility of customs are exempt. 
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Regulatory authority: 
Article 22 (1) and (2) 
2008/06/EC; 
§37(2) and §39(2) PMG; 
At least one regulatory 
authority per member state is 
necessary. It ensures 
compliance with EU directives 
and has to be independent from 
service providers. 
Post-Control-Kommission and 
Rundfunk und Telekom 
Regulierungs-GmbH (RTR-
GmbH) are Austria’s regulatory 
authorities. RTR-GmbH is 
subordinate. 
Licensing: 
Article 9(1) and (2) 
2008/06/EC; 
§26(1) and (2) PMG; 
A license may be required for 
offering postal services within 
the scope of the USO. 
A license is required for 
entrants into the market of 
postal items weighing up to 50 
grams. The USP does not need 
any license. 
Complaint management: 
Article 19 (1) and (2) 
2008/06/EC; 
§§53(1) and 54 PMG; 
Member states ensure the 
opportunity of fair settlement 
of disputes between users and 
universal service providers 
(outside of the court system). 
Regulatory authorities ensure 
the possibility of fair settlement 
of disputes between users and 
postal service providers 
(outside of the court system). 
Net access: 
Article 11a 2008/06/EC; 
§§34, 35, and §36(1) 
PMG; 
When necessary to protect the 
interest of users and/or to 
promote effective competition, 
member states have to allow 
access to zip code systems, 
address databases, post office 
boxes, delivery boxes, 
information about address 
changes, re-direction services, 
and return to sender services. 
Recipients or house owners 
have to install usable house 
letterboxes, otherwise 
recipients are not entitled to 
receive postal items to their 
premises. Until December 31, 
2012, the USP has to ensure 
that suitable house letterboxes 
are installed in all multi-party-
houses. The USP may request 
compensation for the costs of 
such modifications. In 
summary, the USP has to grant 
other postal service providers 
access to zip code system, 
address database, and delivery 
boxes. 
Reciprocity clause: 
Annex II, Article 3(3) 
2008/06/EC; 
 
 
From January 1, 2011, to 
December 31, 2012, member 
states with liberalized markets 
may deny companies from 
member states whose postal 
markets are not opened yet, 
access to the areas still 
protected at these entrants’ 
home countries. 
 
Table 1: Austria’s implementation of the EU directives 
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5.2 Austria’s Postal Law 
 
As mentioned above, Austria’s postal law of 2008 (PMG) is based on Directive 2008/06/EC. 
It also builds on previous domestic postal laws (e.g., PostG42, P-UDV43). In other words, the 
country revised its legal situation in order to conform to European requirements. The PMG 
fully went into effect on January 1, 2011.44 
In the past, Austria followed the three directives that led to the disappearance of 
reserved services by the beginning of 2011. Nowadays, the incumbent still retains almost full 
control of the mail market and is the major player within the area of universal services. As 
mentioned in Chapter 5.1.1, this area constitutes by far the most profitable sector. 
Not included in Table 1, which is concerned with laws regarding universal services, are 
the rules of §32 PMG. Whereas the EU only regulated requirements of USPs, Austria’s 
legislature added this article that places, amongst others, the following obligations on every 
postal service provider: 
• Identification of deliverers and of postal items (by uniforms and signs). 
• Deposit of certain postal items at a venue where recipients can retrieve them after an 
attempt of delivery to their premises has failed. This venue must be within an adequate 
distance from recipients’ premises. 
• Postal outlets must be opened at least 20 hours/week on five days/week. 
• The density of a postal service provider’s post offices must take account of users’ 
needs. 
• Postal service providers must run a complaint management. 
• 90% of domestic mail must be delivered D+2, 100% D+6. 
• 85% of domestic parcels must be delivered D+3, 100% D+8. 
Since customers in our society can freely choose among service providers, the necessity of 
such obligations is open to debate, because low quality of service will lead to a lack of 
customers for any given company. 
                                                            
42 Postgesetz = Austria’s expired postal law 
43 Post-Universaldienstverordnung = Austrian legal ordinance concerning universal postal services 
44 Several passages went into effect earlier (December 5, 2009). As Haubenberger et al. (2010) point out (p. 12), 
those are mainly the parts concerning density of points of contact and of access points, as well as prerequisites 
for closing down a post office (§7 PMG). 
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6 Status Quo in Austria and Abroad 
 
Within the EU, most countries followed the three directives without doing more steps than 
necessary in the direction of liberalization. Yet, some countries were ahead of time. Table 2 
lists selected countries and their regulatory barriers to entry, as well as their VAT exemptions, 
if any, which function as distortions of competition.45 Next to Austria, Spain, which has 
liberalized intra-city-mail decades ago, and all countries that underwent full market opening 
before January 1, 2011, are listed. 
Country Date of full 
liberalization 
VAT exemptions Entry barrier through 
regulatory 
requirements 
Austria January 1, 2011 Universal services provided by 
incumbent. 
medium 
Estonia April 1, 200946 Universal services (legal 
situation with regard to direct 
mail is considered unclear). 
high 
Finland June 1, 1991 No high 
Germany January 1, 2008 Universal services (excluding 
business parcels). 
low 
The 
Netherlands 
April 1, 2009 Letters priced at the public tariff. low 
Spain January 1, 2011 No medium 
Sweden January 1, 1993 No medium 
United 
Kingdom 
January 1, 2006 Universal services provided by 
incumbent. 
medium 
Table 2: Selected countries and barriers to entry 
It must be clearly stated that competition within the postal market is all but vivid in the EU. 
The Netherlands, a country with low regulatory barriers, approximates a combined mail 
market share of competition of 15%.47 Full liberalization came comparably late there. 
Finland, the early riser of the EU, saw its incumbent regain monopoly status due to restrictive 
regulatory barriers. The United Kingdom effectively prohibits end-to-end competition by 
                                                            
45 Resources for Table 2: Winkelmann et al. (2009a); Postconsulting.at (2009), p. 33; Input-Consulting (2009), p. 
15. 
46 Estonia’s postal market had been fully liberalized before in 2001, but the step was taken back in 2006. 
47 Okholm et al. (2010), p. 185. 
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regulation. These examples hint at the fact that without deregulation, there is no real liberty in 
those nominally open markets. 
Austria’s mail market obstructs competition as well, partly due to the regulations 
mentioned in Table 2, but mainly because the incumbent has exclusive access to the 
letterboxes of over a million Austrian households. Therefore, competition in Austria’s mail 
market is virtually non-existent. On the other hand, Spain, a country which opened its market 
as late as Austria, has an accumulated mail market share of competition of approximately 
10%.48 This is comparably high and comes from the historic liberalization of intra-city-mail, 
which began over 100 years ago.49 Intra-city is the natural entry model for small business. 
Thus, such liberalization was, to some extent, truly conducive to a free market. 
Overall, however, European politics seem to protect postal monopolies on all levels. At 
a time of high pressure for market openings, the legal monopoly is relinquished, but the 
dominant firm of each country is kept in a position to exert market power. Time will bring 
higher market shares for entrants to several of Europe’s postal markets, but the political and 
regulatory barriers put a limit on this temporal effect, as the example of Finland illustrates, 
whose liberalization took place approximately two decades ago. 
                                                            
48 Winkelmann et al. (2009a), p. 141. 
49 Postconsulting.at (2009), p. 47. 
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7 Future Prospects and Suggestions 
 
This author does not expect any authority or legislator to heed his advice or the advice of 
authors suggesting similar solutions.50 Thus, the reader will find a clear distinction between 
expectations (Chapter 7.2) and suggestions (Chapter 7.3). There is also a difference in topics 
expounded on in 7.2 and 7.3. Even though some of them, like employment or pricing, are 
congruent, using the same subchapters within 7.2 and 7.3 would have been unsuitable and 
obstructive to the train of thought. 
Before delving into the actual expectations and suggestions for Austria’s postal market, 
it should be stated that this work would remain incomplete without commenting on the issue 
of abuse of dominant position. While adherence to EU-legislation is advocated in this work, 
efficiency is a goal at the heart of the suggestions in Chapter 7.3. Therefore, certain premises 
of European politics may appear to be criticized within these pages, but that shall not be 
misconstrued as a suggestion to deny EU authorities the right to make binding decisions on 
legal grounds. After all, many regulations implemented by the EU are supposed to go against 
market failure. 
Market failure is a “term describing situations in which market outcomes are not Pareto 
efficient. Market failures provide a rationale for government intervention. There are a 
number of sources of market failure. For the purposes of competition policy, the most relevant 
of these is the existence of market power, or the absence of perfect competition.”51 
This definition – and it does not stray decisively from many other accepted definitions – 
appears problematic, because it provides a rationale for government intervention in almost 
every market. Perfectly competitive markets are truly rare (see Chapter 2.2.1). Thus, 
companies face a lack of written legal security, because judges decide on a case to case basis 
by “rule of reason”52. This is, overall, an unsatisfactory condition which calls for a well-
defined legal standard. 
 
 
                                                            
50 In a general sense (not necessarily with an emphasis on postal markets), these would mainly be representatives 
of the Austrian School of economics. 
51 Khemani and Shapiro (1993), p. 55. 
52 Khemani and Shapiro (1993), p. 78. 
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7.1 Abuse of Dominant Position 
 
The OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) published the 
following definition for abuse of dominant position: “Anticompetitive business practices in 
which a dominant firm may engage in order to maintain or increase its position in the 
market.”53 On the same page, the OECD document states that among the contested business 
practices have been 
• charging unreasonable or excess prices, 
• price discrimination, 
• predatory pricing, 
• price squeezing by integrated firms, 
• refusal to deal/sell, 
• tied selling or product bundling and 
• preemption of facilities. 
The EU’s definition of abuse of dominant position (e.g., Article 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union) is not as broad as the OECD’s complaint list above. 
Thus, that list shall serve as a basis for discussion. 
Before explaining those grounds for plaint systematically, let it be stated that as long as 
no barriers to entry block new firms from market entry, a temporal monopoly would, in the 
long term, be unlikely to harm consumers’ welfare a lot more than the present system of most 
markets (oligopoly with considerable barriers to entry). 
 
7.1.1 Charging Unreasonable or Excess Prices 
 
This concept is self-explanatory. To find out what price is unreasonable can be really 
challenging, though, when even overpricing can have reasons that are rooted in economic 
concepts (e.g., snob effect54). 
 
 
                                                            
53 Khemani and Shapiro (1993), p. 9. 
54 “A negative network externality that refers to the decrease in each consumer’s demand as more consumers 
buy the good” (Besanko and Braeutigam, 2010, p. 186). 
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7.1.2 Price Discrimination 
 
According to the OECD, price discrimination “occurs when customers in different market 
segments are charged different prices for the same good or service, for reasons unrelated to 
costs. Price discrimination is effective only if customers cannot profitably re-sell the goods or 
services to other customers.”55 
The latter sentence of the definition shows that the market power behind price 
discrimination can be constrained. Price discrimination can also be based on sound economic 
principles, namely supply and demand (e.g., geographic price discrimination). 
 
7.1.3 Predatory Pricing 
 
As stated in Chapter 4.4.3, predatory pricing takes place when a dominant firm lowers the 
price of a market’s product under the level of production costs. Smaller firms, lacking the 
dominant entity’s economies of scale, then also have to sell at a loss until the situation is 
resolved by a reinstallation of higher prices. That reinstallation possibly takes place after 
forced market exit of one or several smaller companies. 
 
7.1.4 Price Squeezing by Integrated Firms 
 
“A price squeeze occurs where a dominant and integrated firm sells key inputs that it controls 
to its upstream competitors at high prices, and to downstream consumers at low prices, such 
that the upstream competitors are effectively “squeezed” out of downstream market because 
the high prices charged for the input make it impossible to compete in the downstream 
market.”56 
An example for this would be the integrated firm’s sale of rubber to competing 
producers of tires at an increased price, while selling its own tires to consumers at decreased 
prices. 
 
 
                                                            
55 Khemani and Shapiro (1993), p. 68. 
56 Jacobson and Rucker (2008), p. 2. 
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7.1.5 Refusal to Deal/Sell 
 
This concept is also self-explanatory. According to judiciary systems based on Roman law 
(e.g., US, Austria), individual autonomy is a right and relevant in connection with contractual 
freedom.57 This means that a person or legal entity can freely choose to enter into contract 
with another person or legal entity. She also can freely choose not to do so. This right, 
however, can be neutralized by law or verdict. 
 
7.1.6 Tied Selling or Product Bundling 
 
“Refers to situations where the sale of one good is conditioned on the purchase of another 
good. One variant is full-line forcing in which a seller presses or forces a complete line of 
products on a buyer who is predominantly interested in only a specific product.”58 
One prominent example of tying took place in connection with the EU’s Microsoft case. 
Microsoft tied a media player to its operating system and was sued by competitors in the 
market for media players. In the end, Microsoft had to offer an unbundled version of its 
operating system.59 
 
7.1.7 Preemption of Facilities 
 
Preemption of facilities takes place when “an incumbent over-invests in capacity in order to 
threaten a price war if entry occurs.”60 This implies that would-be entrants possess a certain 
level of knowledge about structural conditions at the preempting firm, which seems to be a 
realistic presupposition for the majority of relevant situations. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
57 „Freedom, from which men are called free, is a man’s natural power of doing what he pleases, so far as he is 
not prevented by force of law” (Iustinianus, 1911; 1, III, 1). 
58 Khemani and Shapiro (1993), p. 83. 
59 Commission Decision (2007). 
60 Khemani and Shapiro (1993), p. 13. 
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7.2 Expectations 
 
Austria’s mail market will undergo a number of changes over coming years, because new 
entrants will try to gain a market share. The incumbent is still in full control of the mail 
market. Competition is only functioning in other parts of the postal market (e.g., CEP61). 
The following subchapters depict the development of Austria’s market that may be 
realistically expected when it comes to competition, the regulatory authority, employment, the 
situation of postal outlets, cost of USO, profits, pricing, and substitution. 
 
7.2.1 Development of Competition 
 
Perfect competition is not what can be expected to develop, neither on the mail market nor on 
the overall postal market. Nevertheless, the incumbent’s market power should shrink over 
time, turning the market into an oligopolistic one, where welfare is higher and deadweight 
loss smaller than under a monopoly. The CEP market appears to be functioning that way 
already, as well as early morning delivery of newspapers and parts of unaddressed mail. On 
the other hand, domestic mail, addressed advertising, delivery of newspapers and periodicals 
during the day, and parts of unaddressed mail are under almost total control of ÖPAG due to 
their monopolized access to many house letterboxes. 
The EU’s third postal directive demands that competitors gain access to zip code 
systems, address databases, post office boxes, delivery boxes, information about address 
changes, re-direction services, and return to sender services (Article 11a 2008/06/EC). Austria 
postponed a solution to the problem of monopolized access to house letterboxes to the end of 
2012. By law at least we can expect that all of the issues above be resolved by January 1, 
2013. 
Rasch (2009) points out three relevant factors for ease of market entry:62 
• Population density and degree of urbanization: The more densely populated an area is 
and the more people live within densely populated areas (high urbanization), the 
lower new market entrants’ diseconomies of scale for delivery, compared to the 
incumbent firm – and the higher the potential for competition. 
                                                            
61 Courier Express Parcels 
62 Rasch (2009), p. 180f. 
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• Postal items per capita: High volumes of postal items facilitate market entry by new 
firms, because then strategies of providers with lower market share can be profitably 
realized. 
• Price and quality level of the incumbent: High prices charged by the established 
company give new service providers the chance to undercut the incumbent. This is 
especially true if the established firm does not conduct regional price differentiation. 
A low quality level permits new providers to establish themselves as quality leader. 
Thus, we should foresee competitors working their way into the mail market via large cities. 
Most will first gain a foothold in Vienna or one of the provincial capitals, before expanding 
their operations to less populated areas. The second point is also favorable in Austria. With 
annually more than 300 domestic letter post items per capita, the country’s volumes belong 
into the higher category of very developed countries. Thirdly, while ÖPAG stays away from 
regional price differentiation, its quality level is at a high standard. Therefore, the three 
factors mentioned above indicate a relative ease for the development of competition. Table 3 
shows Austria’s high ranking in the areas of mail items per capita and quality.63 Thereby, 
notice that mail items per capita correlate well with a country’s overall economic status,64 
whereas quality measurements do not, because most countries’ laws traditionally guarantee a 
certain quality level of postal services to satisfy the majority of customers. 
When looking at inhibitors of competition, reputation65 and goodwill66 come to mind. 
Because incumbents have a stronger reputation and more goodwill with customers than new 
entrants to the market, a lower price at the same level of quality is not always enough to 
entice a consumer away from the former monopolist. Rasch (2009) suspects that transaction 
costs of 1-2% of a year’s postal charges, in case of a change from one to another provider, are 
a minor force working against the development of competition.67 
 
 
                                                            
63 Resources for Table 3: Winkelmann et al. (2009a); Okholm et al. (2010). 
64 E.g., domestic letter post items per capita in the year 2007 amounted to 693 in the US (Winkelmann et al., 
2009a, p. 156). 
65 Reputation: „a mechanism for the assessment of quality on markets with information problems.” (Rasch, 
2009, p. 105.) 
66 Goodwill: „the phenomenon that consumers through experience or other kind of information form a good 
opinion about the quality of the product or products of a supplier.” (von Weizsäcker, 1980, p. 412.) 
67 Rasch (2009), pp. 152f. 
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Country Domestic letter post items per 
capita (2007 or year in brackets) 
Percentage of domestic 
priority standard mail 
received next day (2009) 
Finland 396 85 
Norway 362 85 
Sweden 346 85 
Netherlands 342 95 
Luxembourg 327 95 
United Kingdom 326 93 
Austria 305 (2008) 95 
France 289 84 
Denmark 279 93 
Germany 238 >80 
Slovenia 206 95 
Iceland 200 (2005) 85 
Ireland 154 94 
Portugal (mainland) 110 94.5 
Malta 106 92 
Hungary 98 85 
Italy 97 89 
Estonia 86 90 
Czech Republic 84 91 
Cyprus 58 90 
Greece 56 87 
Latvia 54 (2006) 97 
Poland 50 82 
Lithuania 30 85 
Romania 30 85 
Bulgaria 23 80 
Slovakia 20 96 
Table 3: Selected countries’ domestic letter post items per capita, with delivery time data as a quality indicator 
The sources of these costs are pinpointed to 
• the necessity of reprogramming postage meters at major customers, 
• the search for other, more efficient providers (including negotiations), and 
• negative opportunity costs in case of an intended change away from a provider who 
grants quantity discounts on the volumes of a whole year. 
Although these assumptions were made for the German postal market, similar effects should 
be expected in Austria. 
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Rasch (2009) further calculates that a service provider’s reputation is a decision 
criterion for 5.8% of customers.68 This constitutes a small but real factor to slow down the 
development of competition within the postal market. 
Economies of scale play a lesser role in urban areas than in rural ones. Competitors can, 
if regulation forbids price differentiation, switch to cost differentiation by differentiating with 
regard to delivery time.69 This approach, however, is restricted by legally limited delivery 
times. 
Bear in mind that an entrant does not have to follow the strategy of covering every sub-
segment of the postal market, as the USP does. New companies may have a higher chance by 
concentrating on, e.g., sorting only, mass mailings only, or by covering certain areas 
exclusively. The latter case opens a window of opportunity for another type of service 
provider who connects those smaller, regionally limited firms, giving them the opportunity to 
accept mail to areas outside of their territory of activity. 
In closing this topic, if no new protective laws are passed in favor of the former 
monopolist, Austria’s competition can start to develop next to ÖPAG within an oligopoly as 
soon as monopolized access to house letterboxes is a thing of the past. However, it is unclear 
if the incumbent’s position as market leader can be disputed in the long run. This mainly 
depends on the question whether its VAT exempt status in the area of universal service letters 
(Chapter 7.3.2) will eventually be abolished. 
 
7.2.2 Strong Regulatory Authority 
 
Rasch (2009) points out that market regulation is usually justified by the attempt to avert 
market failure (see Chapter 7.1), and he further states that authorities are obligated to come up 
with a very good reason when interfering with a market by regulation.70 The latter part of the 
statement cannot be observed regularly in the real world of politics and economics. Especially 
when bearing in mind that many markets slowly emerge from a situation of rigid 
governmental controls, it stands to reason that the obligation to justify interference is not 
taken seriously by all sides. 
                                                            
68 Rasch (2009), p. 154. 
69 Rasch (2009), p. 159. 
70 Rasch (2009), p. 47f. 
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According to positive theory of regulation, a surplus of regulation can be observed 
within most or all economies for several reasons:71 
• Political actors decide on a rational basis and aim at maximizing personal utility, just 
like other actors within an economy. There also exists a market for regulatory 
intervention, consisting of supply and demand. Small, homogeneous lobbies can 
achieve their goals more successfully, because by helping them, politicians can usually 
maximize their increase in votes. This is the case because shifting small groups’ costs 
to the public does not lead to remarkable public resistance due to their overall 
insignificance. 
• Lack of knowledge with regard to lost efficiency due to regulation. 
• Politicians’ interest in gaining more regulatory powers and larger budgets for 
regulatory authorities. 
Most authors writing within the field72 demand a strong hand that tells postal service 
providers what to do, from pricing to employment issues and much further. Many of these 
same authors interestingly pretend to be in favor of open markets. Even supporters of liberal 
markets often argue in favor of a strong regulatory authority. Below, an exemplary catalogue 
of demands will be quoted:73 
• Equipping the postal regulatory authority with sufficient personnel and financial 
means. 
• Additional competence of the postal regulatory authority to actively and independently 
investigate sector-specific matters of competition. 
• Clear authorization of the postal regulatory authority to access market participants’ 
information and key figures, accompanied by market participants’ obligation to 
produce data on request. 
• Application procedure for all postal service providers. Authorization of the regulatory 
authority to perform tests in order to ensure a minimum-quality of suppliers. 
• Application entails duties (e.g., quality standards). 
• The minister responsible for postal matters sets the quality standards required of the 
USP. 
                                                            
71 Rasch (2009), pp. 51-53. 
72 E.g., FFPI (2010), Geist et al. (2008), Postconsulting.at (2009), Winkelmann et al. (2009b), to name but a few. 
73 Postconsulting.at (2009), pp. 69-71. 
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• Continuous quality tests (including random controls) of all postal market participants, 
controlled by the postal regulatory authority, in order to be able to ensure that no 
quality problems arise in connection with access to house letterboxes. 
• Effective regulation of the distinct universal service fees by the postal regulatory 
authority. 
• Fees must be examined annually by the postal regulatory authority. 
• Fees and flexible price agreements for universal services by the USP, must be 
announced, examined, and published in an adequate way, in order to ensure the 
agreements’ non-discriminatory application, as well as their orientation toward the 
concept of avoided costs. The postal regulatory authority can demand the adaptation 
of fees and individual price agreements to specified levels and forbid individual price 
agreements in case of a failure to adapt fees. 
When reading the list above, the attempt to understand how it could have been penned by 
supposed supporters of liberalized markets can be challenging. The likely future regulatory 
authority depicted therein at least appears rather incompatible with the idea of free markets 
(see Chapter 7.3.10). However, liberalization and deregulation are two different concepts. For 
this reason, the installation of such a body can be realistically expected, at least due to a lack 
of resistance. The effect will be a market that indeed becomes more liberal, but where 
liberalization can be cut off at any time by steadily increasing regulation. 
 
7.2.3 Employment 
 
While there is no clearly identifiable trend regarding headcounts of employed postal workers 
within liberalized markets,74 the number of hours of employment regularly decreases after a 
country’s liberalization.75 This means that many full-time jobs are eliminated and substituted 
for different types of part-time jobs, while total employment in time units goes down. Overall, 
this means lower employment costs, which is an expectable economic result, because 
competition leads to lower producer surpluses (see Chapter 3.1). I.e., pressure is applied on 
the market’s companies to cut costs and optimize efficiency, which is an incentive to keep the 
workforce small. Flecker and Hermann (2009) expound on this fact, but wrongly criticize 
these natural workings of the economy: 
                                                            
74 Winkelmann et al. (2009a). 
75 Winkelmann et al. (2009b), pp. 86-90. 
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“Instead of improving efficiency by expanding the amount of output with a constant 
labour force, public-service providers in liberalised markets cut back on their staff 
numbers.”76  
As in typical modern-day media coverage, they seem to fail to realize two constraints: 
1. It is not economical for a company to just produce more output in order to be able to 
offer enough work to all of its employees. The necessary demand has to exist. 
Otherwise, every producer who sells a certain good with a margin, would sell as much 
as he can produce, with only one constraint: input of work and materials. This model 
would immediately lead to an unemployment rate of zero. Unfortunately, it ignores 
many factors of the real world. 
2. Companies cannot keep unnecessary workers employed, just to be social and to do 
something against unemployment. This is especially true under competitive pressure. 
Common opinion argues that the capital is greedy, and, therefore, does not employ 
more workers. However, a company has limited resources, which includes capital. 
This has led to bankruptcy of some that did try to afford a larger workforce than 
necessary.77 
Austria should expect steadily diminishing employment (in time equivalents) within the 
postal market, as soon as access to house letterboxes is available to competition. 
 
7.2.4 Postal Outlets 
 
Of the pre-liberalized markets, only Sweden experienced a spark in the total number of 
outlets. All other countries saw either stagnation or a fall from 2003 to 2007. Also significant 
is the fact that liberalized markets have comparably low percentages of traditional post 
offices. Most of the outlets there are agencies run by third parties.78 
Answering the new law (PMG) which requires a minimum of 1,650 post offices or 
agencies on Austrian soil, ÖPAG had announced that it would far exceed this number. 
However, by February 2010, the total number of postal outlets reached the prescribed 
minimum. While having a third party run an agency costs ÖPAG EUR 15,000 annually, the 
                                                            
76 Flecker and Hermann (2009), p. 5. 
77 Bear also in mind that losing a job is not the end of a person's story. Layoffs can induce the affected workers 
to find new and modernized ways of employment. Some of them would become entrepreneurs themselves and 
create new jobs in a field that is up to date. 
78 Postconsulting.at (2009), pp. 54, 59. 
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funds needed for a post office during the same period of time add up to between EUR 60,000 
and 70,000. ÖPAG still ran 1,133 own post offices as of July 2010, while the number of 
agencies run by third parties had risen from six in 2001 to 415 in 2009.79 
The legal situation in Austria bears an additional incentive for the development of a 
higher percentage of agencies. §34 GewO80 disenthralls businesses from any additional 
prerequisites or obligations. Thus, no regulatory barrier to entry exists in this case.81 
Country Percentage of incumbent’s 
post offices among outlets (end 
of 2009) 
Percentage of agencies run by 
third parties among outlets 
(end of 2009) 
Austria 73% 27% 
Finland 17% 83% 
Germany 3% 97% 
The Netherlands 21% 79% 
Sweden 10% 90% 
United Kingdom 3% 97% 
Table 4: Post offices vs. agencies run by third parties in Austria and in postal markets that were liberalized 
before 2011 
Table 4 compares Austria’s ratio of the number of the incumbent’s own post offices vs. 
agencies run by third parties to those of five early risers of full postal liberalization.82 There 
cannot be much doubt that the latter type will soon represent the majority of outlets in Austria 
too, while the number of post offices run by the USP can be expected to decline strongly. The 
total number of outlets, however, will remain stable around 1,650, since this is the mandatory 
minimum. 
 
7.2.5 Compensation for USO 
 
No fully liberalized postal market within the EU ever needed compensation payments to help 
the incumbent fulfill the USO. Instead, providing universal services was profitable.83 
However, this leaves open if each operational and every geographical part of the USO is 
                                                            
79 Haubenberger et al. (2010), pp. 15, 17f., 26, 41. 
80 Gewerbeordnung = Austrian trade law 
81 „If provided by businesses, no particular authorization is needed for the provision of services within the postal 
system, with the exception of monetary and payment transactions.” As Haubenberger et al. (2010) point out (pp. 
43, 46), in practice, a business is also allowed to conduct money deposits and disbursements, as well as cash 
inflows and outflows for customers, without a bank concession. 
82 Haubenberger et al. (2010), p. 42. 
83 Postconsulting.at (2009), p. 60. 
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profitable. Under the current system of five delivery days per week, this is highly unlikely for 
the most remote delivery boxes, but currently the USO remains assigned to the incumbent as a 
profitable whole. ÖPAG profits by it and prefers to be Austria’s legally assigned USP over 
not being the provider of universal services. The company will not complain about costs of 
remote delivery. Thus, no compensation will be paid to the USP. 
 
7.2.6 Pricing 
 
From 1998 to 2009, only Germany and Italy saw decreasing price levels (see Table 5)84. 
These cannot be ascribed to an advanced state of liberalization, though, because Estonia, 
Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, and United Kingdom experienced a rise during the same 
time.85 
Country 20g priority 
standard letter 
tariff in EUR 
(1998) 
Changes in 20g priority standard letter tariff 
between 1998 and 2009 
Price 
trend 
Austria 0.51 2003: 0.55 + 
Belgium 0.42 2003: 0.49; 2004: 0.50; 2006: 0.52; 2008: 0.54; 
2009: 0.59 
+ 
Finland 0.50 2000: 0.59; 2001: 0.61; 2002: 0.60; 2003: 0.65; 
2007: 0.70; 2009: 0.80 
+ 
France 0.46 2003: 0.50; 2005: 0.53; 2007: 0.54; 2008: 0.55; 
2009: 0.56 
+ 
Germany 0.56 2003: 0.55 - 
Ireland 0.41 1999: 0.38; 2002: 0.41; 2003: 0.48; 2007: 0.55 + 
Italy 0.62 2004: 0.60 - 
Luxembourg 0.39 1999: 0.40; 2000: 0.45; 2003: 0.50 + 
The Netherlands 0.36 2001: 0.39; 2007: 0.44 + 
Portugal 0.40 2000: 0.42; 2002: 0.43; 2004: 0.45; 2009: 0.47 + 
Table 5: Analysis of price trend in selected postal markets 
Rasch (2009) examines price elasticity within postal markets and reaches the conclusion that 
the market as a whole is rather inelastic, but that a comparably high elasticity can be observed 
within the segment of advertisements. This segment can, therefore, be expected to lag behind 
with regard to rising future prices, since competition not only applies pressure from within the 
                                                            
84 Resources for Table 5: Winkelmann et al. (2009a); Okholm et al. (2010). 
85 Winkelmann et al. (2009a); Okholm et al. (2010). 
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postal market, but also comes from suppliers of marketing via TV, radio, newspapers, 
billboards, phone, and other channels.86 
Austria’s incumbent raised its prices in May 2011 (after full liberalization) the last time. 
E.g., the tariff for standard letters of the lightest category was increased from 55 to 62 Cent. 
The time of further increases will almost exclusively depend on inflation, because regulation 
obligates the USP to set prices geared to costs (for products within the USO). Competitors 
will be heavily dependent on ÖPAG’s prices then, because higher prices deter customers and 
lower prices are very hard to attain due to the incumbent’s economies of scale. 
 
7.2.7 Profitability 
 
Total profits of incumbents in fully liberalized postal markets are lower than those of mail 
monopolies. This seems to be different when observing the mail segment only (see Table 6)87. 
Decreasing profits are indeed a natural result of markets with a high degree of liberalization 
(see Chapter 2.2). The higher profits of Germany and Finland within the mail segment can be 
ascribed to the fact that Germany was a mail monopoly at the time the numbers for the 
statistics were gathered (2007) and Finland had returned to being a de facto monopoly due to 
harsh regulation (see Chapter 6). 
Centrum für Europäische Politik (2007) mentions supportive data for the point just 
made.88 In 2006, 53% of DPAG89 profits came from the mail market, even though it 
constituted only 21% of the total market. A profit margin of 15.4% within the mail segment, 
compared to margins of 1.9% for express and 3.4% for logistics, also affirms this author’s 
interpretation. Bear in mind that the German mail market was monopolized up to an item-
weight of 50 grams back then.  
Therefore, profit margins within the Austrian mail market should be expected to 
decrease. 
 
 
                                                            
86 Rasch (2009), p. 22f. He admits, though, that this information is based on an ex-post-observation of markets 
before liberalization and not applicable to individual liberalized markets. 
87 Postconsulting.at (2009), p. 62. 
88 Centrum für Europäische Politik (2007), p.5. 
89 Deutsche Post AG = German Postal Services Inc. 
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7.2.8 Electronic Substitution 
 
Royal Mail, e.g., expects plummeting of letter volumes by more than 20% between its fiscal 
years 2010/11 and 2015/16 due to electronic substitution.90 
The most likely ways of electronic substitution can be subsumed under three 
categories:91 
• B2B: e.g., EDI (electronic data interchange); 
• B2C: e.g., direct presentments on websites, direct marketing via e-mail or SMS;92 
• C2C: e.g., e-mail, fax, SMS; 
Additional ways of substitution which are already practiced, are virtual mailboxes, electronic 
billing, and e-government applications.93 
Another form of substituted mail is hybrid mail. This is a mixture of electronically 
substituted and traditional mail items. Such letters are sent to a postal service provider in data 
form, containing the intended content and the recipient’s name and address. The provider then 
prints it out close to the addressee, envelops it, and delivers it in physical form.94 Due to the 
fact that such letters are cheaper than traditional ones, the size of the market would, ceteris 
paribus, shrink in case of substitution of large volumes. 
It remains to be seen if volumes will actually decrease. Past projections of dramatic 
plummeting of total mail volumes turned out to be false. One effect even works in the 
opposite direction: Internet users in the US and the UK receive approximately two times as 
much mail items as persons without internet access.95 
Overall, a small negative effect of electronic substitution on overall volumes and total 
market size should be expected. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
90 Hooper (2010), p. 20. 
91 Rasch (2009), p. 24. 
92 Substitution in the area of direct marketing does not necessarily lead to lower mail volumes. Additional 
marketing letters and high volumes of catalogues are often sent due to electronics-based marketing. 
93 Maegli et al. (2010), p. 7. 
94 E.g., Andersson (2006), p. 69. 
95 Rasch (2009), p. 25. 
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7.3 Suggestions 
 
Postconsulting.at (2009) argues that the fact that almost all incumbents of liberalized markets 
continue to hold an addressed mail market share beyond 90% is due to economies of scale, 
which would make entry for small firms difficult.96 Still, the fact that competition in CEP-
markets and other segments works much better is an argument against that theory. Especially 
since technical prerequisites for different postal market segments are not very distinct. The 
stronger reason for lacking competition is the legal situation. In Austria, e.g., denied access to 
house letterboxes, the incumbent’s VAT exemption, relatively strict market regulation and 
further noncash benefits, legally granted to ÖPAG (see Chapter 7.3.9), constitute very good 
reasons for their dominant and steady market position. Other countries face not identical, but 
similar situations. In one way or the other, each country’s legal situation protects the former 
monopolist’s dominance. 
Table 6 further strengthens this author’s position, even though once again a false 
conclusion was drawn from the data by Postconsulting.at (2009). It was assumed that EBIT97 
of the addressed mail segment is more telling than overall EBIT and, thus, stated that profits 
of liberalized markets do not drop.98 The fact of the matter is that profits of de-monopolized 
markets do drop. They are supposed to, as this author argued in Chapter 7.2.7. The reason 
why EBIT of addressed mail is still so high, is that legal situations continue to grant 
incumbents market power. This leads to high margins, i.e., monopolistic or oligopolistic 
margins (softened by the potential appearance of new entrants despite high barriers to entry). 
Country EBIT margin (postal market) EBIT margin (mail segment) 
Austria 7.0% 19.8% 
The Netherlands 10.8% 17.5% 
Germany 5.0% 16.0% 
Denmark 7.2% 14.4% 
Finland 6.0% 10.3% 
France 6.2% 7.0% 
Sweden 5.1% 5.3% 
United Kingdom 2.5% 2.8% 
Italy 10.3% 2.0% 
Table 6: Selected countries’ EBIT margin of the postal market and of the mail segment 
                                                            
96 Postconsulting.at (2009), p. 64. 
97 earnings before interest and taxes 
98 Postconsulting.at (2009), p.62f. 
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Regulation causes minor administrative costs and further costs in connection with the 
legislative process. The major part of direct costs then comes from the establishment and 
sustentation of the regulatory authority. Indirect costs arise from a disturbance of the free 
market. Based on this, Rasch (2009) lists the following inhibitors of competition:99 
• Conditions to acquiring a license (overregulation). 
• USO (obligating small companies to provide universal services). 
• Fiscal discrimination (VAT exemption). 
• Political interference (minimum wage). 
He then goes on to name three factors which facilitate the development of competition (the 
higher the easier): 
• Population density and level of urbanization. 
• Absolute mail volumes and volume per capita. 
• Level of prices and quality at the incumbent. 
Each suggestion, and the problems pointed out in the remainder of this chapter, will be 
connected to at least one of these points. 
 
7.3.1 Access to Infrastructure 
 
Third Party Access (TPA) is the input of postal items into the network of the established 
company at a point that is closer to the recipient than the point of handover by the sender.100 
In Germany and the United Kingdom, the incumbents are obligated by law to grant 
competing firms and customers access to their infrastructure at a reduced fee.101 Thus, small 
companies who lack a network that covers the whole German territory (or UK territory, 
respectively), can accept postal items to every destination. However, enforced access 
infringes upon property rights. Such regulation requires a good justification in a free 
economy. Rasch (2009) argues that TPA is justified whenever networks or parts of networks 
are absolutely necessary in order to reach recipients, and when these parts of networks cannot 
be created by competitors with adequate means.102 
But under perfect conditions in a free market, access conditions should be freely 
negotiable by market participants. Perfect conditions would indicate that there is no 
                                                            
99 Rasch (2009), pp. 112, 176-181. 
100 Rasch (2009), p. 78. 
101 Postconsulting.at (2009), pp. 37-41. 
102 Rasch (2009), p. 47f., 77f. 
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bottleneck resource under the control of one single firm. According to Knieps (2008), a 
monopolistic bottleneck is103 
• indispensable for reaching customers, as far as no comparable resources exist, and 
• non-duplicable by realistic investments. 
Chapter 3 demonstrates how competition leads to lower market prices. Not only active 
competition can drive monopoly prices down. This is also true for potential competition. 
Bottlenecks can only exist if there is neither active nor potential competition. When there is 
more than one infrastructure that a service provider can choose amongst, then no bottleneck is 
in existence, even if the infrastructures are technologically uneven.104 
Rasch (2009) concludes in his dissertation about TPA that postal networks do not 
consist of bottlenecks, that net access should not be enforced by governments, but that market 
participants should enjoy freedom to negotiate conditions by themselves.105 
Although no bottleneck (because duplicability is given), a very crucial resource for 
postal service providers are multi-party-house letterboxes. The letterboxes of more than one 
million households, especially in urban areas, are not accessible by competitors of Austria’s 
incumbent. The same problem concerns 300,000 more people in connection with rural 
disposal boxes (LAK).106 As long as no solution to this disparity is realized, ÖPAG keeps a de 
facto monopoly on addressed mail (domestic mail, addressed advertising, delivery of 
newspapers and periodicals during the day) and huge parts of unaddressed mail. As 
mentioned above, the Austrian legislator allows a time window until the end of 2012 to 
eliminate the obstacle. By then, competitors’ access to these letterboxes must be granted. 
Forced access to the incumbent’s infrastructure appears to be an infringement of property 
rights on first glance. But this is not the case, because a solution where each competitor 
installs his own set of letterboxes in a multi-party-home is not in the interest of residents, and 
since the boxes are not ÖPAG property but belong to house owners or residents, it is 
understandable to see shared access as the best and most fair solution (Directive 2008/06/EC, 
Article 11a). 
There is overall agreement in economic literature that the question whether a network 
resource should be made accessible to competitors by an incumbent is the question whether 
                                                            
103 Knieps (2008), p. 103. 
104 Rasch (2009), p. 114. 
105 Rasch (2009), pp. 267-268, 270. Maegli et al. (2010), p. 10, point out that the road system is the only 
bottleneck in connection with postal services. Due to the fact that at the time of this writing, no discriminatory 
prohibition of road use can be anticipated, no need for regulation arises with regard to roads. 
106 Postconsulting.at (2009), p. 74. 
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the network resource constitutes a bottleneck.107 After all, regulated access to the incumbent’s 
infrastructure interferes with the market’s free workings, but since the infrastructure in 
question is property of house owners, access to delivery boxes is properly justified. Austrian 
law also follows the EU’s directive and grants competitors access to zip code systems and 
address databases. The questions whether this measure is properly justified and if there can be 
a more efficient alternative to sharing that data (e.g., compensating the incumbent for sharing 
these systems), remain open to debate. 
 
7.3.2 VAT Exemption 
 
VAT exemptions qualify as a distortion of competition (see Chapter 4.4.2). Austrian banks 
and governmental institutions are also VAT exempt and constitute the biggest business 
customers of postal services, especially of mail services. Consumers who cannot be 
reimbursed for VAT, also have an advantage in choosing the VAT exempt ÖPAG as their 
service provider. Due to a tax of 20%, these parties would encounter a disadvantage when 
choosing another company. This advantage of the USP concerns more than half of all postal 
items. Significantly, a cross-border letter handed in to the incumbent and transferred to the 
responsibilities of a foreign service provider, is VAT exempt, whereas the same letter handed 
in directly to an Austrian outlet of that foreign provider and delivered abroad would be subject 
to 20% Austrian VAT.108 We see, therefore, that a de facto protection of the former 
monopolist still takes place here. 
Another effect functions in the opposite direction: the incumbent cannot deduct input 
tax, which works in favor of its competitors. But this effect is much smaller than the effect of 
VAT on prices. 
This author suggests an end to ÖPAG’s VAT exempt status in order to facilitate the 
forming of a competitive Austrian postal market. 
 
 
 
                                                            
107 E.g., Zenhäusern and Vaterlaus (2007), p.2, or Rasch (2009), p. 1. 
108 Postconsulting.at (2009), p. 75. 
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7.3.3 Scope of Universal Services 
 
Austria voluntarily widened its scope of universal services to express letters, newspapers and 
periodicals, and mass mailings.109 These should be excluded from the scope and the EU’s 
legal obligation should only be fulfilled to a bare minimum. Without rules for universal 
service quality, functioning competition would, in the long run, propel firms to provide a 
service quality above the required minimum. Additional regulatory oversight of quality 
standards in the areas mentioned above is not necessary for the time period until functioning 
competition is established, because services outside of the USO are also subject to quality 
requirements (§32 PMG). 
 
7.3.4 Assignment of USP 
 
In Germany, no company is assigned as USP. Market forces suffice to ensure postal coverage 
of the whole territory and prices went down in this situation of competition, but pressure does 
exist for DPAG to fulfill a quasi-USO.110 If it would not do it, another company would fill the 
gap. In such a situation, Germany’s postal law would obligate other service providers to 
financially aid a company that fills the service gap. Most of that aid would have to come from 
the incumbent due to its high market share. 
In Austria, laws would have to be changed if the USP would be disestablished (e.g., 
ZustG111). §2 ZustG rules that authorities’ mail has to be delivered by the USP. More than 
85% of ÖPAG profits come from universal services.112 This shows that the USO entails a 
highly profitable business. A profitable business would be pursued by firms on their own in a 
free market. Thus, the long term goal for the Austrian postal market should be a situation 
where universal services are sufficiently provided by the market without an assigned USP. 
However, the USO’s overall profitability does not ensure that all areas of the country would 
be sufficiently covered without such an assignment. In case of insufficient coverage, a 
minimum of regulation could, therefore, be applied as long as problems remain unresolved. If 
they turn out to remain unresolved, tendering for the USO would be the way to go (see 
Chapter 7.3.13). 
                                                            
109 Postconsulting.at (2009), p. 52. 
110 Postconsulting.at (2009), p. 83. 
111 Zustellgesetz = Austrian postal delivery law 
112 Postconsulting.at (2009), p. 67. 
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7.3.5 Density of Access Points 
 
Access points can be 
• post offices run by the USP, 
• agencies (postal outlets run by third parties), and 
• street letterboxes. 
The EU does not prescribe a certain density. It lets member states decide on the amount of 
necessary access points. This situation should be embraced. The directive demands a density 
in accordance to users’ needs. What does that mean? This author strongly supports the idea 
that it should, in the long run, mean the density which would be the outcome of market forces. 
The Austrian legislator should, advised by the regulatory authority, remove expectations with 
regard to numbers and quality requirements (e.g., maximum distance to access points) and let 
the market rule to determine density of access points. Italy, Spain, and Sweden demonstrate 
that the market functions without prescribing a certain density or quality standards.113 As in 
those countries, the regulatory authority must observe the market and enforce the EU’s 
directives by preventing situations, in which inhabitants get cut off from postal services. 
Closing down post offices should be allowed under the same regulatory prerequisites. 
An adaptation of postal law is, therefore, necessary. §3 P-UDV, which puts restrictions on 
plans to close down postal outlets, should be transformed into a new liberal law. Rules about 
opening hours and products should not be imposed on the USP. A free market can find 
solutions for actual demand that might remain unsatisfied (not necessarily the same demand 
that authorities anticipate). In addition to new solutions which arise from innovative activity, 
possible remedies are rural deliverers, mobile post offices, postal service points114, or hybrid 
mail solutions (see Chapter 7.3.12). 
In summary, density requirements should be removed in such a manner that enough 
time is available for new innovations to take root and for alternative solutions to postal access 
points to be established. The constraint is to refrain from cutting off inhabitants from postal 
services and comparable solutions. This warrants a certain extent of regulatory activity. 
 
                                                            
113 Postconsulting.at (2009), p. 53. 
114 Haubenberger et al. (2010), p. 11. 
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7.3.6 Pricing 
 
When it comes to pricing, the Austrian legislator turned the EU-directive into law, without 
further regulations. It calls for “affordable” prices of universal services. But as Stratil (2010) 
affirms, at the moment that wording effectively means whichever price the universal service 
provider chooses to charge.115 
Postconsulting.at (2009) mentions that ÖPAG was able to lower costs in the area of 
addressed mail but did not turn these savings into lower prices. As a reason, the lack of price 
regulation by authorities is offered.116 In the long run, however, functioning competition 
should solve the problem, as pointed out in Chapter 3.1. Under the workings of a free market, 
an entrant could use the incumbent’s high prices to acquire customers from him through lower 
prices. But momentarily, ÖPAG still has unchallenged market power, inherently granted to it 
by the legislator. Therefore, it is not easily feasible for a competitor to undercut the former 
monopolist’s price under the burden of lacking access to many customers’ letterboxes, 
relatively heavy regulation and the obligation to charge VAT, as opposed to ÖPAG’s VAT 
exempt status. 
To make the market more economically sound, prices could be discriminated between 
urban and rural addressees. This would mean that letters sent from cities to remote locations 
would usually be more expensive than those staying within urban areas, simply because their 
delivery incurs higher costs. As unfair as that may seem at first glance, postal fees are carried 
by senders, and statistically, rural households receive more letters than they send, while the 
majority of senders of high volumes have their premises within cities.117 Notice also that such 
price discrimination would not be entailed by the definition of abuse of a dominant position, 
since it is related to costs (see Chapter 7.1.2). 
Supply and demand would also cause geographical and temporal price differences, as is 
the case with gasoline prices. Regulating against such fluctuations appears harmful to the 
overall economy. When put into practice, it regularly changes the price at which free market 
forces end up and causes a deadweight loss. E.g., a price ceiling would lead to a shortage in 
the supply of services (see Figure 7), as soon as it becomes binding, i.e., the equilibrium price 
                                                            
115 Stratil (2010), p. 12. 
116 Postconsulting.at (2009), p. 67. 
117 Rasch (2009), p. 62. 
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lies above the maximum price. The merely theoretical event of a binding price floor would 
lead to a surplus, where not enough demand for the services offered in the market is available. 
Nevertheless, the regulatory authority should oversee prices in the short run in order to 
prevent abuse of the incumbent’s dominant position. Charging of unreasonable or excess 
prices (see Chapter 7.1.1) could take place otherwise, while monopolized access to letterboxes 
and VAT exempt status are still given. ÖPAG could see a motivation to prepare for a less 
profitable future by such an abuse. 
 
Resource: own illustration, based on Mankiw (2001), Figure 6-3 
Additionally, cream skimming and regional price differentiation should be accepted as 
realities of a free market. This would lead to lower prices within regions of high population 
density and higher prices where low population density abides.118 Even though a natural 
allocation by market forces would lead to a higher total welfare, the topic remains hard to 
politicize. 
Do rural inhabitants have a right to get financial aid from urban citizens in order to 
encounter the same price level? Do not have urban citizens the right to consume services at 
the lower prices of natural market allocation and do not have people the right to found firms 
that operate within a limited area by choice, in order to have a better chance of establishing 
themselves on the market (cream skimming)? An answer to these questions is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
                                                            
118 Economies of density (Rasch, 2009, p. 190). 
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In closing, the suggestions for pricing within Austria’s postal market were 
• to conduct slightly intensified regulatory oversight of universal services’ prices (which 
have to be geared to cost) in the short run, in order to prevent abuse of the incumbent’s 
dominant position, 
• to leave the term “affordable” from the EU’s directive unspecific (i.e., as a long run 
goal: no price regulation apart from universal services that, according to the EU’s 
directives, have to be geared to cost) and 
• to allow cream skimming (entry opportunity for small business) and price 
differentiation. 
 
7.3.7 Quality 
 
The EU prescribes nationwide delivery of postal items. However, if market forces suffice to 
make this a reality, no single firm has to be obligated to take responsibility for territorial 
coverage. Additionally, expensive delivery causes upward pressure on price levels. Therefore, 
the opportunity to keep delivery costs low should be given to service providers by allowing 
them to utilize rural disposal boxes (LAK). 
With the goal of maximum welfare, the national regulatory authority should, since the 
EU grants it the power, allow the USP to apply alternative solutions when it comes to delivery 
to areas where difficult circumstances abide (e.g., less delivery days and/or hybrid mail 
solutions). It should also grant delivery to LAK without much complication, whenever 
efficiency of service providers is at stake. 
Overall, the market should be allowed to freely determine range of products and 
services offered at outlets, their opening hours, and delivery times. However, the regulatory 
authority should, as long as ÖPAG (or another company) has a dominant position in the 
market, remain focused on possible abuse of that dominant position, most likely in the form 
of refusals to deal (Chapter 7.1.5) or cases of tying (Chapter 7.1.6). 
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7.3.8 Reciprocity 
 
Reciprocity is a concept that is easy to politicize. It appears fair to prohibit market entry of 
foreign firms, as long as domestic firms are kept from entering their markets. However, 
reciprocity decreases total welfare. 
Figure 8 shows a simplified version of the issue. At a price of 6, total welfare is 
W+X+Y, with W being consumer surplus and X+Y being producer surplus. If entrants were 
able to lower the price to 4, total surplus would rise to W+X+Y+Z, whereas consumer surplus 
would then be W+X+Z, and producer surplus Y. 
Resource: own illustration, based on Mankiw (2001), Figure 9-5 
If, on the other hand, the theoretical case would come true, in which potential competitors 
from abroad were unable to keep up with comparably low domestic prices, they would be 
deterred from entering and the domestic market would remain unaffected. Therefore, opening 
the market leads to equal or higher total welfare and should be conducted. 
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7.3.9 Non-Discrimination 
 
In order to enjoy the benefits of a truly free market in Austria, unfair inequalities should be 
removed.119 ÖPAG is still privileged in several areas. Among them are 
• VAT (see Chapter 7.3.2), 
• automobile liability insurance, 
• license plate registration,  
• the privilege to deliver authorities‘ mail (as mentioned in Chapter 7.3.4), and 
• permissions for operational facilities120. 
On the other hand, ÖPAG is subject to a disadvantageous minimum wage. This inequality 
should also be removed in the long run, along with those mentioned above. The question 
whether the minimum wage should be abolished or introduced to other market participants 
also, is open to debate (see Chapter 7.3.11). 
 
7.3.10 Licensing 
 
The recipient of a license for the provision of postal services will have to spend a minor 
amount of money to acquire the license and she will also be subject to certain duties of a 
license holder. Even though the effect of both is negligible in Austria, they constitute a matter 
of governmental interference. Such regulation needs to be justified, e.g., by being necessary to 
avoid market failure.121 
§32 PMG does not contain harsh obstacles for Austrian license holders, but, e.g., 
Finland, the country that liberalized its market before all other European ones in 1991, lost all 
competition in the area of addressed mail due to strict market regulation. The reason can be 
found in the legal situation, which puts the USO or an alternative compensation fee upon each 
and every market entrant.122 Comparably small firms, however, cannot fulfill that obligation 
and apart from other countries’ incumbents, only comparably small firms are the potential 
                                                            
119 Postconsulting.at (2009), p. 68f. 
120 An example for this type of privilege is the USP’s free use of up to two square meters of public space, granted 
through §12(3) PMG. 
121 Rasch (2009), p. 48. 
122 This situation was changed by the EU’s third postal directive. It does not allow to force the USO on every 
active market participant. 
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market entrants. Thus, Itella occupied 100% of the market for addressed mail again, forming a 
de facto monopoly, protected by the state. 
This author concludes that unnecessary regulation hurts the development of competition 
and decreases total economic welfare. When it comes to such regulation, not only a high 
amount of wrong is wrong, as in Finland, but also a little wrong is wrong, as in Austria. The 
cost of running regulatory activities must be paid by someone. It does not matter whether the 
according tax burden is on taxpayers as a whole, or on postal service providers. Either way, it 
represents a distortion of free market forces and reduces societal welfare. At the same time, no 
threat of market failure seems to arise from an alleviation of licensing, because EU-
requirements with regard to the USO remain intact. Therefore, licenses should not be 
necessary for entry into Austria’s postal market. 
 
7.3.11 Employment 
 
 
Resource: own illustration, based on Mankiw (2001), Figure 6-5 
A minimum wage for deliverers keeps the market from establishing a wage in line with 
market forces. This leads to higher consumer prices and less jobs within the postal sector. 
Figure 9 shows a job shortage caused by the hypothetical minimum wage of 6 within the labor 
market. Keep in mind that the market for work is subject to very similar forces as markets for 
products and services. Therefore, abolishing the minimum wage would lead to higher 
employment rates. However, the least searched for employees would earn less than under a 
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minimum wage, but employees who provide better work than the average would be paid 
above average wages, according to their performance. Workers’ negotiating skills would also 
be part of the equation. 
Bear in mind that ÖPAG is bound to collective contracts, whereas quasi-freelancers can 
be employed by competitors without such contracts.123 This is an advantage for market 
entrants, but ÖPAG can do the same at its daughter-companies, e.g., Feibra. Nevertheless, 
discriminatory legal situations should be eliminated altogether. Therefore, the question comes 
up whether any minimum wage should, in the long run, be removed in order to create more 
jobs, or if competitors should also become subject to a minimum wage. When it comes to 
unskilled workers, who are the main beneficiaries of minimum wages, employers do exert 
market power on the market for work. They are able to dictate details of labor contracts since 
every applicant can be quickly replaced by another person who is searching for a job and 
willing to accept what employers expect from the contract. 
In summary, this author refrains from any specific recommendation on the policy on 
employment for Austria’s postal market. Competitors could either become subject to the same 
minimum wage as is ÖPAG, or the market’s minimum wages could be removed altogether. 
This depends on whether the legislator aims at higher employment numbers or at 
counteracting employers’ market power on the labor market. 
 
7.3.12 Number of Clearance and Delivery Days 
 
Five days of clearance and delivery per week are the legal minimum requirement by EU 
directive. However, since Estonia, Spain, Italy, Montenegro, Latvia, and Lithuania offer six 
weekly clearance days (some of them each week, others during some weeks) without a legal 
obligation to do so124, it stands to reason that this enhanced service could pay off for a postal 
provider. Nevertheless, the efficiency of the matter is individual for each country, and finding 
out whether six days of clearance or delivery would be profitable in Austria is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
On the flipside, the problem of expensive last mile delivery to remote addressees can be 
bypassed. Hybrid solutions are already underway in Switzerland and Finland: Physical mail is 
delivered only twice a week at the Finnish version of the project, but on every workday, 
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124 Postconsulting.at (2009), p. 50. 
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recipients are notified by SMS whenever a letter arrives. The letter is then scanned 
immediately and the according file transmitted to them electronically. Austria and again 
Switzerland offer a last mile solution for receivers of parcels, too. The Austrian version gives 
customers the chance to assign a shop of their choice as delivery address for their parcels. All 
they have to do is to pick their postal items up at that shop.125 
Therefore, in the long run, conditions around addresses that cannot be efficiently served 
five times per week should get defined as “circumstances or geographical conditions deemed 
exceptional” under Directive 2008/06/EC, Article 3 (3), in order to give firms the freedom to 
conduct delivery and clearance less frequently and/or to partly switch to hybrid mail and 
alternative last mile solutions. In the short run, however, regulatory care must be taken that 
inhabitants neither find themselves temporally cut off from postal services, nor feel forced to 
consume alternative services (e.g., hybrid mail) when they have privacy concerns or other 
reservations. 
 
7.3.13 In Case of Market Failure 
 
If the legislator would opt for the solution of leaving the USO to market forces, an alternative 
plan would be necessary to ensure universal services in case of market failure. The next 
alternative would be to let companies tender for the role of USP. In that case, no 
compensation would be necessary, because tendering firms regularly calculate the risks 
involved in taking over the role, but then need to fulfill the obligation, even under financial 
hardships. Overall, though, the USO is known to be highly profitable. So far, the early mover 
markets of liberalization, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom, and Germany, also have not run 
into the problem of necessary compensation for any firm providing universal services. The 
Netherlands, the country with the most functional competition on the European market, has a 
ROI (before tax) of 20.3% in connection with the USO. On the other hand, Spain’s USP gets 
subsidies of 41% of universal service costs. Italy has the only active and functioning 
compensation fund.126 Such a fund is a worse solution than tendering, because it is a de facto 
tax on postal services.127 
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126 Postconsulting.at (2009), p. 56. 
127 Rasch (2009), p. 61. 
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If a country sees no other choice but to regulate market participants’ activities, at least 
the integrity of a market should remain untouched, instead of establishing government run 
companies, or even turning the market into a protected monopoly again. Brunetti and Michal 
(2007)128 conclude that in case of market failure, regulation of private firms is more efficient 
than governmental monopolies stepping into the breach. 
Overall, knowing that the free market solution is likely to leave remote regions 
undersupplied with regard to conventional postal services, this author believes that, in the 
long run, alternative solutions and new innovations by free market participants would keep 
remote addressees from getting cut off from services. In the actual event of market failure, 
tendering for the role of USP in accordance to §12(1) PMG is the recommendation for postal 
legislation. 
                                                            
128 Brunetti and Michal (2007), p. 5. 
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8 Conclusion 
 
This thesis explained the economic theory of monopolies and competitive markets. It clearly 
delineated that efficiency, as well as total societal welfare, are higher under free market 
competition than under government regulated monopolies. Contrary to popular belief, such 
welfare does not mean a shift of wealth from consumers to producers. The opposite is the 
case, whereas monopolies can amass financial surpluses by charging consumers higher prices 
than they could under competition. 
From there, light was shed upon the issues of liberalizing postal markets, whereby the 
full liberalization of mail markets is usually the last step. The EU’s and Austria’s own 
regulatory framework for the postal liberalization were another key point of the analysis, as 
well as a short outline of the present situation of the markets of several countries with an 
advanced status of liberalization, and of Austria. 
These were steps leading up to the main chapter of this work – the previous one – which 
expounded on the possibility of a market participant’s abuse of its dominant position, on 
expectations concerning the Austrian mail market, and on suggestions that an economist 
could give to the Austrian legislator, under the assumption that the EU’s directives are a given 
and cannot be changed through the political process. Table 7 shall serve as a short 
representation of the results. The analysis behind it can be found within the chapters above, 
especially Chapter 7. 
These results cannot hide the fact that this author favors small government when it 
comes to healthy economics. Other schools of thought (e.g., Keynesianism) would reach 
different conclusions). 
A recurring theme during the creation of this thesis was the scarcity of comparable data. 
Research yields a number of topical works about slim elements of one part of one country’s 
market and a few consulting firms have done a good job – partly on behalf of the EU 
Commission – in compiling data sets of several countries, especially EU members. However, 
the political arena of Europe is still very scattered. Legal frameworks differ strongly from 
country to country and, therefore, a cause-and-effect chain identified in one country, cannot 
be readily applied to another one.  
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The same lack of comparability holds true for incumbent companies and market 
entrants. This offers large room for future empirical work, which could be greatly facilitated 
when Europe’s legal situation becomes more standardized. 
Topic Expectations (medium to long run) 
Development of competition Decreasing incumbent market share / Oligopoly 
Powers of regulatory authority Steady increase 
Employment Steady decrease 
Number of postal outlets Relatively stable / Less post offices, more agencies 
run by third parties 
Compensation for USO None 
Prices Dependent on costs 
Profits Decrease 
Electronic substitution Wider range of hybrid services / leading to slight 
decrease of mail volumes 
 
Topic Suggestions (long run) 
Access to infrastructure Grant access obeying Directive 2008/06/EC; 
enforced access to house letterboxes and LAK is 
economically sound 
Incumbent’s VAT exempt status Abolish 
Scope of universal services Decrease to minimum prescribed by Directive 
2008/06/EC 
Assignment of USP No assignment 
Density of access points Unregulated 
Pricing Unregulated / Universal services geared to cost 
Quality Unregulated as long as market provides minimum 
prescribed by Directive 2008/06/EC; regulate 
against abuse of dominant position 
Reciprocity No 
Non-discrimination Abolish inequalities between ÖPAG and 
competitors 
Licensing No license requirement 
Employment Dependent on policy: either uniform minimum 
wage or unregulated (no minimum wage) 
Minimum number of clearance and 
delivery days 
5, according to Directive 2008/06/EC / Let market 
bypass regulation through alternative solutions 
In case of market failure Tendering for USO 
Table 7: Expectations and suggestions for Austria’s postal market 
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